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Palmieri, p. 1 
The Colonial Politics of Water:  




 Throughout the nineteenth century British colonial epistemology engendered conceptions 
of Afghanistan’s rivers as modes of economic and militaristic gain in broader South Asia.  This 
perception of the country’s rivers was not only portrayed in British travelogues of Afghanistan 
but also in visual representations of the country, many of which accompanied such works on 
Afghanistan.  These reductive views of Afghanistan contributed to a hyper-emphasis on 
exploitable resources and the politicization and ‘territorialization’ of Afghanistan’s rivers.1  
Afghanistan, thus, was mapped into existence as the frontier between British India and the 
potential foreign encroachment into Central Asia.  Such conceptions extrapolated Afghanistan’s 
rivers, primarily the Indus and the Oxus, as the nation’s relative borders.2  In assembling these 
maps and travel accounts, British colonial officials repeatedly disregarded information from 
local, indigenous informants, resulting in the neglect of indigenous boundaries in exchange for 
borders that buttressed the colonialist imaginary.  Utilizing nineteenth-century British colonial 
cartography, sketches, and photographs, this paper aims to conduct a comparative study of these 
colonial visual representations of the Indus and Oxus Rivers during the First Anglo-Afghan War 
(1839-1842) and the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1880), respectively.  
 
 
1 “Territorialization” here is meant to convey Britain’s claims to rivers in Afghanistan and how Britain made 
national claims to resources in the empire’s periphery.  
2 The Indus River is located in modern-day Pakistan.  However, nineteenth-century British colonial literature and 
cartography included the Indus River in Afghanistan’s geography.  Therefore, this paper will adopt the geography of 
these maps to provide insight into the British colonial presence in broader South Asia.  Moreover, the native name 
for the Oxus River is the Amu Darya River.  The term “Oxus River” will be used in this paper on colonial visual 
representations, since this phrase was the term that Britain prioritized. 
 
 
As mapping reflected a desire to control, British imperialists were guided by larger colonial 
economic and military incentives that secured the empire’s presence in South Asia.  The First 
Anglo-Afghan War witnessed intensive studies of the Indus River which were dominated by a 
longstanding interest in the river as a pathway to commercial activity in Central and South Asia.  
By dominating the Indus River, colonialists maintained that the empire could secure the transport 
of British-Indian goods with ease.  The Second Anglo-Afghan War, however, marked a discrete 
shift in epistemology.  Rather than emphasizing the profitability of Afghanistan’s waterways, the 
dominant colonial epistemology of the Second Anglo-Afghan War concerned itself with 
territorial occupation.  With ever-increasing Russian advancement into Central Asia, British 
colonialists conceived the Oxus River as a political border that protected Afghanistan’s existence 
as a frontier to India.  Whether the mentalities surrounding these geographic portrayals were 
economic or political, representations of both the Indus and Oxus River embodied the dominant 
colonial epistemologies that accompanied the militaristic gaze of the First and Second Anglo-
Afghan Wars.  In such depictions, Britain “re-wrote” the history of Afghanistan and South Asia 
to confirm and justify its perceived longstanding presence in the region.  By pursuing linear 
narratives of history, British colonial agents imposed their understanding of civilization onto 
Afghanistan, regularly neglecting Afghanistan’s peoples and traditions. 
 
Mountstuart Elphinstone’s Precedent for British Colonial Cartography 
Within a discussion on British colonial mapping of Afghanistan, it would be a remiss to 
neglect Mountstuart Elphinstone’s impact on the field.3  First published in 1815, Elphinstone’s 
 
3 Mountstuart Elphinstone (1779-1859) was the British ambassador to Afghanistan.  He wrote extensively about the 
country, even though he himself had never ventured beyond Peshawar.  His work An Account of the Kingdom of 
Caubul (1815) became akin to an ‘encyclopedia’ for understanding Afghanistan.  
 
 
An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul set a precedent for colonial mapping of Afghanistan and 
Central Asia.  As with the vast majority of British colonial officials, Elphinstone employed a 
severe “mistrust locals and the information they provided, while also retaining confidence in 
[his] own superior rationality and reasoning abilities.”4  This complacency privileged his own 
imperial conceptions of South Asia, embedded with a colonialist agenda, even when lacking or 
faulty.5  In highlighting his conformity to the British colonial agenda, the preface of An Account 
of the Kingdom of Caubul expressed that “the acquisition of general information” from his 
journey into the Kingdom of Caubul (Afghanistan) “[was] likely to be useful to the British 
government.”6  
 
Even with his distrust of local informants, Elphinstone did acknowledge the limits of his own 
knowledge.  When in need of supplementary information, he borrowed from maps and accounts 
by other colonial officials.  According to Elphinstone, his portrayal of the geography was derived 
from Lieutenant Macartney, the “climate, soil, produce and husbandry” from Lieutenant Irvine, 
“the trade and revenue” from Richard Strachey, and the history from Robert Alexander.7  
However, Macartney and his map loomed particularly large in Elphinstone’s mind and work.  
While introducing his own cartography, Elphinstone confessed that “part of [his] geographical 
 
4 Shah Mahmoud Hanifi, “A Book History of Mountstuart Elphinstone’s An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul,” in 
Mountstuart Elphinstone in South Asia:  Pioneer of British Colonial Rule, ed. Shah Mahmoud Hanifi (New York:  
Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 29.  
5 For more information on the construction of British colonial maps in India, see Matthew H. Edney’s Mapping an 
Empire:  The Geographical Construction of British India, 1765-1843 (London, Chicago:  University of Chicago 
Press, 1997). 
Although he does not address the question of Afghanistan, he details the professed superiority of British maps of 
India that were often based upon arbitrary surveys, faulty technology, and skewed visual depictions.  
6 Mountstuart Elphinstone, An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, and its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and 
India (London:  Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1815), p. iii.  
https://www.wdl.org/en/item/16798/#q=elphinstone&qla=en (accessed 25 May 2020). 
7 Ibid.  
 
 
knowledge was borrowed from [Macartney].”8  While there were several inconsistencies 
between the maps of Elphinstone and Macartney, the influence of Macartney’s map on 
Elphinstone’s work is pivotal for situating Elphinstone’s account in the larger context of the 
imperial imaginary; one in which colonialist works built upon each other in the interests the 
British Empire.  
 
The appeal of the Indus River to the British Empire was overwhelmingly commercial.  As 
communicated in the preface of An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, Strachey was assigned 
the task of surveying revenue and trade, while Irvine detailed soils and flora.  These categories 
 
8 Elphinstone, An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, p. v.  
Figure 1: Elphinstone’s map Caubul on a Reduced Scale Shewing its Relative Situation to the Neighboring Countries. 
 
 
themselves were indicative of colonialists’ concern with the economic profitability of 
Afghanistan, which, in time, became epitomized in geographic representations of the Indus 
River.  Elphinstone, admittedly, encompassed little knowledge of the Indus River himself.  Much 
of his information depended upon descriptions by Mr. Foster who “had no instruments” and was  
considered to “not be so good a judge” but was nevertheless “superior . . . to the natives” in 
regard to providing information worthy of a reliable map.9  Elphinstone dedicated much of his 
description of the Indus River to discussing its branches, which were just as pivotal as the river 
itself in colonial mapping.10  He elaborated on the land surrounding these branches in the Punjab 
territory, stating that the “quantity of rich land uncultivated” was “excessively rich with black 
clay.”11  In illustrating this lush territory, he expressed that “It is rather odd that there should be 
scarcely any on trade” utilizing the Indus River and its branches.12  By highlighting the land’s 
cultivability and potential for trade, Elphinstone established Britain’s earliest commercial 
interests in the Indus River territory.  
 
This importance placed on the Indus River and its branches was further accentuated in his 
reduced scale map of the neighboring countries of the “Kingdom of Caubul”.13  This map 
embodied an early emphasis on the Indus River by darkening the Indus River in comparison to 
other rivers and territories included on the map.  Its inclusion in the Kingdom of Caubul 
indicated that this river and its branches were valuable assets to Britain.  The fertile lands 
surrounding the branches of the Indus River were situated towards the eastern side of the 
 
9 Elphinstone, An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, p. vi. 
10 Elphinstone, An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, p. 652.  
11 Elphinstone, An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, p. 654.  
12 Ibid.   
13 Mountsuart Elphinstone, Caubul on a Reduced Scale Shewing its Relative Situation to the Neighboring Countries 
[map], scale not given, in An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul.  
 
 
Kingdom of Caubul territory, marking a border between the Kingdom of Caubul and 
Hindoostan.  This professed division of territory established the Indus River as a relative political 
border in subsequent colonial mapping.  Supporting this illustration and the colonial assumption 
of the Indus as a political border, Elphinstone included the Indus River in his list of the 
“boundaries of Afghaunistaun,” located in his table of contents.14 
 
The Economic Viability of the Indus River 
 With Elphinstone’s work fueling British perceptions of and engagement with 
Afghanistan, Britain believed that it could benefit politically, militarily, and economically from 
the Indus River.  Beginning in the 1830s, British officials adopted an “anti-Russian British policy 
toward Afghanistan,” weary of the recent Russian advancement into Central Asia.15  By targeting 
the Indus River, British colonial agents were confident that they would secure access to the 
broader Central Asian market.  In efforts to combat Russia’s economic advancement, Britain 
undertook its own “commerce-based colonial strategy,” one that prioritized a study and 
subsequent monopolization of the Indus River.16  With this perception, the Indus River became 
“the gateway to that (Central Asian) market” and “the future highway of British commerce into 
Afghanistan and beyond.”17  The nomadic trader Sayyid Muhin Shah was consequently 
transformed into an agent for British “commercial experiments . . . that validated the profitability 
of sending Indian and European goods” to Afghanistan via the Indus River.18  The hyper-
emphasis on the Indus River throughout the 1830s was a product of the broader Indus Scheme, 
 
14 Elphinstone, An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, p. iv. 
15 Shah Mahmoud Hanifi, Connecting Histories in Afghanistan:  Market Relations and State Formation on a 
Colonial Frontier (Stanford:  Stanford University Press, 2011), p. 54. 
16 Ibid.  
17 B.D. Hopkins, The Making of Modern Afghanistan (New York:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 47. 
18 Hanifi, Connecting Histories in Afghanistan, p. 55. 
 
 
“which came to dominate policy circles in the 1830s and envisaged the establishment of a free 
trade empire via commercial navigation of the Indus River.”19  Although the colonialists seeking 
economic gain from the Indus River knew little of its navigability, the river became a symbol of 
both “the expansion of British commerce” and “the projection of British power.”20  Through 
steam technology, Britain strove to exert control over the Indus River so that it could profit from 
its market and commerce.  The country enacted imperialistic “Indus Projects” to secure 
dominance over the river, as well as foster Afghanistan’s economic dependence on British India.  
Specifically, British colonialists targeted Afghanistan’s Lohani nomadic traders to enact its 
“colonial project to ‘open up’ the Indus River for commercial navigation.”21  Referred to as the 
“Mithenkote scheme,” Britain conceived Afghanistan as a commercial market and subsequently 
emphasized “commercial migration” in which the Lohanis “were imagined as being able to run 
multiple shorter trading circuits to the banks of the Indus during one year.”22  It was in this 
commercial-centric environment that British colonial mapping of Afghanistan and the Indus 
River emerged, establishing economic gain and market profitability as the dominant 
epistemology of British colonial cartography.  
 
Mapping the Indus River 
 British colonial agents attempted to expand the British market in Afghanistan through the 
Indus River, ultimately undertaking militaristic endeavors.  In December of 1838, Britain 
deployed an Anglo-Indian force, titled the Army of the Indus, into Afghanistan under captain Sir 
Keith Alexander Jackson.  According to Hanifi, the “Army of the Indus was a manifestation of 
 
19 Hopkins, The Making of Modern Afghanistan, p. 47. 
20 Hopkins, The Making of Modern Afghanistan, p. 48. 
21 Hanifi, Connecting Histories in Afghanistan, p. 61.  
22 Hanifi, Connecting Histories in Afghanistan, p. 63.  
 
 
the colonial imagination then dominated by the Indus commercial navigation project.”23  
Preceding the First Anglo-Afghan War, Britain’s ultimate goal of this campaign was to replace 
the Afghan amir, Dost Mohammad Khan, with Shah Shuja who Britain felt was more 
sympathetic to their aims and less subject to Russian influence. 
 
In the Army of the Indus’s campaign, Jackson kept a book of sketches, excerpts, and maps, 
elaborating on various Afghan cities and their proximity to the Indus River, as well as their 
profitability in terms of irrigation and fruit production.  Simply the name “the Army of the 
Indus,” in both the actual army and in the map’s title, showcased the tunnel-visioned focus 
Britain had on the Indus River.  The first image in Jackson’s account was a map of the route of 
the Army of the Indus, taking precedence over his other sketches and any text included in his 
work.24  Much like Elphinstone, Jackson immediately highlighted the Indus River as one of 
Britain’s primary foci simply by darkening the river as the relative border of Afghanistan.  While 
Jackson’s account was not as detailed as Elphinstone’s encyclopedic descriptions, he referenced 
Elphinstone’s work in describing the tribal relations of Kabul, indicative of the prolonged 
influence of Elphinstone’s map in establishing the Indus River as Afghanistan’s eastern border.25  
Jackson’s map likewise illustrated cities, such as Caubul, Mukran, and Sinde.  These cities were 
discussed in his book in larger, capitalized fonts, situating them with near equal importance as 
Afghanistan itself, further mapping the colonialist imaginary of Afghanistan into existence.  
Jackson’s map labeled cities along the Indus in great detail, especially in comparison to how he 
 
23 Hanifi, Connecting Histories in Afghanistan, p. 55. 
24 Sir Keith Alexander Jackson, Views in Affghaunistaun, Etc., from Sketches Taken During the Campaign of the 
Army of the Indus (London:  W. H. Allen & Company, 1840) 
https://www.wdl.org/en/item/17740/#q=havelock&qla=en (accessed 25 May 2020). 
25 Jackson, Views in Affghaunistaun, p. 2.  
 
 
labeled other rivers and cities.  Again, these were not innocent stylistic choices; such portrayals 
in mapping exemplified the river’s 
perceived importance for imperial 
Britain, as well as the limits of 
colonial knowledge and mapmaking.  
 
The text accompanying this map 
was equally revealing in 
demonstrating Great Britain’s 
economic motives for securing the 
Indus River.  In describing the city 
of Maidaum, Jackson extensively 
discussed the valley that 
encompassed “groves of luxuriant 
trees” and the abundance of fruit, 
labeling it as “a perfect paradise” for 
the Army of the Indus.26  His 
account of Kwettah was similar in 
that it detailed “the gardens surrounding 
the town” as being “full of English flowers and fruits . . . and many other varieties of English 
field vegetation,” further emphasizing Britain’s concern with agriculture for economic gain.27  
By referring to the vegetation as “English,” he showcased Britain’s entitlement to and attempt to 
 
26 Jackson, Views in Affghaunistaun, p. 27. 
27 Jackson, Views in Affghaunistaun, p. 47.  
Figure 2: Sir Keith Alexander Jackson’s map, Map of the Route of the 
Army of the Indus, 1839. 
 
 
exert control over Afghanistan, assuming that the country’s agriculture could be inherently 
“English.”  Such descriptions also embedded colonialist narratives into British popular culture by 
making the periphery, Afghanistan, known to the unfamiliar readers of the metropole, Great 
Britain.  Kandahar fell victim to the same patterns in elaborating on the “well cultivated” gardens 
that “supply fine fruit and vegetables.”28  However, Jackson’s report of Kandahar was 
particularly notable because he attributed the gardens’ success to the irrigation system, based in 
the Indus River.  Associating agricultural success solely the Indus River represented Britain’s 
claim to this river as a clear path to the “Afghan and Central Asian markets.”29  This effort to 
secure the British pathway along the Indus as the most viable one was a product of the Indus 
scheme that prioritized the sale of British and British-controlled goods.  
 
The latter half of Jackson’s work focused on the Indus River more explicitly, specifically in his 
descriptions of Bukkur, Roree, Sukkur, and Tatta in which he situated all four of these cities in 
relation to the Indus River.  His accounts of Roree and Tatta elaborated on and emphasized the 
agricultural products of the region, as many British colonial works of the Indus River had in this 
period.  In the “vicinity of Tatta,” there were “thriving” products, such as “the grape, the 
pomegranate, the fig-tree, the apple, &c. &c.”30  “On the south side of [Roree],” were “date trees, 
and the grape, orange, and pomegranate, abound in its gardens and orchards.”31  Sukkur was 
located in a similar vicinity as these other luxurious cities, resting on the “western bank of the 
Indus.”32  While it utilized the Indus River, it was namely “for security” rather than “any natural 
 
28 Jackson, Views in Affghaunistaun, p. 51. 
29 Hopkins, The Making of Modern Afghanistan, p. 48. 
30 Jackson, Views in Affghaunistaun, p. 91. 
31 Jackson, Views in Affghaunistaun, p. 75. 
32 Jackson, Views in Affghaunistaun, p. 79. 
 
 
or artificial strength.”33  Following this observation, Jackson rendered Sukkur “necessarily weak 
and unimportant,” due to the lack of its agricultural productivity.34  Although all cities that 
Jackson referenced in his work rested directly along the Indus River, he placed primary 
importance on the ones he deemed profitable based on their production of fruits.  His instinct to 
deem Sukkur as drastically less important than its neighboring cities demonstrated Britain’s 
commercial interest in Afghanistan through capitalizing on the Indus River and markets attached 
to it. 
 
In conjunction with his maps of the Indus River, Jackson 
included several sketches that further emphasized the 
themes embodied in his maps.  His images holistically 
militarized Afghanistan, portraying Orientalist narratives 
of the country as barren and lacking in ‘civilization’.  His 
title page alone immediately sketched a canon as a 
representation of the Indus River and Afghanistan.35  He 
dwarfed the natural environment of the Indus River 
compared to the grandiose forts.  By emphasizing the 
‘modern ’fortresses in relation to Afghan tribal life, Jackson 
displayed Orientalist themes that fueled Britain’s ‘entitlement’ to Afghanistan and its resources 




34 Ibid.   
35 Jackson, Views in Affghaunistaun.  
36 See figures 4 and 5 on p. 13.  
Figure 3: Jackson’s title page in Views in 




Beyond the Indus’s profitability, Jackson ‘re-wrote’ Britain’s history by establishing historical 
connections to Alexander the Great as a metaphor and justification for Britain’s own colonial 
expansion.  He offered his historical perspective by detailing, “On the north side of the town is 
the ruined castle or fortress of Sehwaun, by which it is completely commanded; this is perhaps 
the most extraordinary building on the Indus, and no doubt existed before the invasion by 
Alexander the Macedonian.”37  By evoking Alexander the Great’s conquest along the Indus 
River, Jackson related it to Britain’s own establishment of the castle that was under British 
command.  His own perception of Alexander the Great’s longstanding history in Afghanistan 
reinforced narratives of the nation as a site of conquest and invasion.   
 
 Other works delineating the Army of the Indus, specifically Sir Henry Havelock’s 
Narrative of the War in Afghanistan, in 1838-39, similarly contained maps of Afghanistan that 
focused overwhelmingly, if not exclusively, on the Indus River.  The title of Havelock’s map, 
Sketch Map of the Route of the Army of the Indus in 1838-39, placed priority and value on the 
 
37 Jackson, Views in Affghaunistaun, p. 85. 
Figure 4: One of Jackson’s sketches that highlighted Britain’s 
emphasis on its military presence along the Indus River. 
Figure 5: One of Jackson’s sketches that emphasized the 




river in the title alone, akin to as Jackson had.38  The militaristic climate of the First Anglo-
Afghan War directly impacted these cartographic representations of Afghanistan in title, 
descriptions, and the map itself.  Havelock’s map too reflected the trend of framing eastern 
Afghanistan by the Indus River, with Havelock forming a more distinct border than previous 
maps.39  This effort prioritized the Indus River and the fertile territories surrounding it, 
manipulating political boundaries along the Indus to suit Britain’s commercial interests.  
 
 
38 Havelock, Sir Henry.  Sketch Map of the Route of the Army of the Indus in 1838—39 [map].  Scale not given.  In 
Narrative of the War in Affghanistan, in 1838-39, (London:  Henry Colburn), p. 337.  
https://www.wdl.org/en/item/17740/#q=havelock&qla=en (accessed 25 May 2020).  
39 James Atkinson,” Sketch Map of Afghanistan” [map], scale not given, in The Expedition into Affghanistan:  
Notes and Sketches Descriptive of the Country, (London:  W.H. Allen and Company) 
https://www.wdl.org/en/item/17794/#q=Atkinson+map&qla=en (accessed 25 May 2020). 
Figure 6: Hovelock’s map Sketch Map of the Route of the Army of the Indus in 1838-9. The map demonstrated 
the role of the Indus River in defining Afghanistan’s borders. 
 
 
Akin to the vast majority of colonialists, Havelock put forth his own historical narrative of 
Afghanistan that reinforced the veracity of a continual British presence.  For instance, he credited 
Alexander Burnes (1805-1841), British explorer and diplomat, with being the first “who 
explored the feelings of a genuine traveler” in detailing the Indus River.40  Havelock’s account 
repeatedly utilized information by Alexander Burnes, thereby positioning Burnes as a definitive, 
objective source on Afghanistan, an effort that privileged Burnes’s own militaristic and 
commercial narrative over the knowledge of local informants.  Havelock’s third chapter devoted 
attention to “[Kabul’s] fruit bazaars and shops,” a destination reached after his journey alongside 
the Indus River.  It cannot be overlooked that this commercial activity in Kabul was the very 
target of the Indus Scheme.  By dominating the Indus River, British colonial agents employed a 
stratagem that availed “the dominance of British goods in the Kabul bazaar.”41  In his description 
of the bazaar, Havelock equated the display of vegetables in the Kabul market to “the markets of 
the British capital.”42  Ovens in the market “were drawing loaves made up in the European 
fashion . . . in which the inhabitants of Cabool and Candahar delight.”43  Much like Jackson 
portrayed Afghanistan’s vegetation as “English”, Havelock too participated in an analogous 
method of detailing Afghanistan; the primary aim of which was to make the colonial periphery 
familiar to and attainable by the metropole.  Beyond solely fostering accessibility to a wider 
British audience, Havelock’s report also indicated the penetration of British material culture into 
the Kabul market.  With frequent references to British Indian-dominated routes and markets, his 
map was symbolic of the epistemology surrounding the First Anglo-Afghan War, one that linked 
the expansion of economic and military gain as achievable through war and conquest.  
 
40 Havelock, Narrative of the War in Affghanistan, p. 13. 
41 Hopkins, The Making of Modern Afghanistan, p. 48. 





The Russian Threat:  Transitioning to the Oxus River 
 While Britain’s concern with the Indus River did not disappear in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, its focus did shift towards securing and mapping the Oxus River.  Leading up 
to and surrounding the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1880), Britain became increasingly 
concerned with the Russian presence in Central Asia, a threat that could be sensed in British 
literature.  In 1871, T.G. Montgomerie published his work “Report of ‘The Mirzas’ Exploration 
from Caubul to Kashgar.”44  Focusing heavily on the Oxus River and Kabul, he emphasized 
Russia’s expanding presence along the Oxus River and its surrounding territories.  He repeatedly 
referred to a Russian frontier, narrating a Lohani merchant’s description of the frontier and 
elaborating on the routes to Russian posts and forts.  He cataloged the Narain River over which 
“the Russians have built a bridge, protected by a fort with 500 men” and continued to describe 
Russia’s military presence, clearly indicating the threat of “the Russian garrisons increasingly 
rapidly.”45  
 
Beyond the menacing presence of Russian-secured territories, he underlined Russia’s cultural 
and material presence in these territories, namely in the clothing market.  Men’s caps were 
“generally made of plain Russian broadcloth,” elite women wore clothing “embroidered with 
twisted silver thread got from Russia,” and elite men and women alike wore boots made of 
Russian leather.46  In contrast to Russia’s material culture, Montgomerie idealized and glorified 
Britain’s presence in Central Asia and its technologies.  He elaborated on when the Mirza met 
 
44 T.G. Montgomerie was a lieutenant-colonial who assisted British surveys of South and Central Asia.  
45 T.G. Montgomerie, “Report of ‘The Mirzas’ Exploration from Caubul to Kashgar,” The Journal of the Royal 
Geographical Society of London 41 (1871), p. 177.  
46 Ibid.  
 
 
local officials and merchants in Yarkand to discuss relations between the British and Russian 
governments.  While Montgomerie makes no mention of the Mirza’s response to the Russian 
government, he claimed that the Mirza “pointed out the great power, resources, &c. of the 
British.”47  He articulated that the matchlocks imported from Russia were “inferior,” while the 
arms that Britain produced were “much prized.”48 
 
Montgomerie was not the only British colonial official to write of Russian threats along the Oxus 
River.  Sir Henry Creswicke Rawlinson, an army officer in the British East India Company, 
wrote a book entitled England and Russia in the East, justifying the book’s necessity due to the 
“encroachments of Russia in the East.”49  More explicit in his fear of Russian expansion than 
Montgomerie, he maintained that Russia’s progress fostered a sense of “impending gravity” of 
the situation along Afghanistan’s Oxus River.50  Throughout his work, he discussed the methods 
by which Russia had established a presence in “the fertile valleys of the Oxus.”51  Specifically, 
Russia secured the mouth of the river and had sent Russian steamers along it as well. 
 
Poets echoed these competing narratives in securing Afghanistan.  Sir Alfred Comyn Lyall, in 
his poem “The Amir’s Soliloquy”, wrote, “Shall I stretch my right hand to the Indus, that 
England may fill it with gold?  Shall my left beckon aid from the Oxus?  the Russian blows hot 
and blows cold;”52  In these lines, he politicized and territorialized the two ‘primary’ rivers of 
 
47 Montgomerie, “Report of ‘The Mirzas’ Exploration, p. 174. 
48 Montgomerie, “Report of ‘The Mirzas’ Exploration, p. 179.   
49 Henry Creswicke Rawlinson, England and Russia in the East (London:  John Murray, 1875) 
https://www.wdl.org/en/item/17717/#q=england+and+russia+in+east&qla=en (accessed 25 May 2020). 
50 Rawlinson, England and Russia in the East, p. vii.  
51 Rawlinson, England and Russia in the East, p. 138. 
52 “Sir Alfred Comyn Lyall.”  In Anglophone Poetry in Colonial India, 1780–1913:  A Critical Anthology.  Edited 
by Gibson Mary Ellis (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2011), p. 285.  
 
 
Afghanistan.  He extended the colonial competition for Afghanistan to these rivers, granting 
Britain the notion of ‘saving ’Afghanistan.  However, Russia, associated with the Oxus River, 
was radicalized in unpleasant environments of hot and cold.  More symbolically, Lyall’s poem 
extended metaphors of good and evil to Britain and Russia by associating Britain with the right 
hand, the hand of ‘saving’ grace, and Russia with the left, the ‘demonized’ hand.  As with many 
colonial works, this poem implicitly attempted to vindicate Britain’s goal of controlling the Oxus 
River by implying that Britain could grant it fortune as opposed to Russia’s unpleasant 
conditions. 
 
Although Britain’s anxiety surrounding Russian expansion was exaggerated in many regards, it 
was not entirely without warrant.  Russia did have a relatively secured presence in Central Asia, 
as demonstrated by the swelling Russian economic threat in the years before the First Anglo-
Figure 7: Russia’s map of northern Afghanistan entitled Map of the Khanate of Khiva and the Lower 




Afghan War.  However, the Second Anglo-Afghan War and the years preceding it were met with 
heightened attention to the Oxus River by both British and Russian powers.  Russian powers held 
a militaristic presence along the Oxus River and participated in its cartography, as Britain had.  
Nevertheless, Russian mapping did not seem to employ the British tactic of ‘re-writing’ history 
to justify its presence.  The Russian map, Map of the Khanate of Khiva and the Lower Reaches of 
the Amu Darya River, emphasized the Oxus River in its construction, as well as included the 
river’s name in the title of the map itself.53  Published in 1873, this map was a symbol of the 
Russian military presence and its newly annexed territory, the Khanate of Khiva and Emirate of 
Bokhara, along the Oxus River.  While this map is only a singular example of Russian 
cartography concerning the Oxus, it referred to the river as the Amu Darya River, its local name.  
In contrast, Britain almost exclusively utilized the name the Oxus River, a term of Greek origin.  
By employing a Greek term, as opposed to the native term, British colonialists reflected the 
perennial themes manifested in mapmaking:  the mistrust of indigenous information and the 
process of “re-writing” history to convey Europe’s supposed longstanding presence in 
Afghanistan. 
 
Wanting to prevent Russian expansion and viewing Peshawar and “the sources of the Oxus” as 
matters “of considerable interest,” Britain attempted to exert control over the Oxus River.54  With 
the common understanding of science as an objective field untainted by colonialist prejudices, 
British officials latched on to racialized sciences to prove their dominance.  Just as Britain had 
previously referenced Alexander the Great in attempts to achieve a historical narrative of 
 
53 Map of the Khanate of Khiva and the Lower Reaches of the Amu Darya River [map].  Scale is versts (Moscow: 
Military Topography Directorate, 1873) https://www.wdl.org/en/item/15034/#q=Map+of+the+Khanate&qla=en 
(accessed 25 May 2020). 
54 Rawlinson, England and Russia in the East, p. 212. 
 
 
conquest, colonial officials began to craft an Aryan-homeland identity to the Oxus River and its 
surrounding territories.  Namely, German linguists sought connections to Indo-European 
languages in Central Asia.  The British Empire, therefore, asserted itself as the culmination of all 
civilization, seeking control over territories that had fallen from their former Aryan “golden-
age.”  These ideas concerning linguistics reached Britain relatively quickly and were popularized 
in Friedrich Max Müller’s Lectures on the Science of Language.55  He professed that “there was 
a small clan of Aryans settled probably on the highest elevation in Central Asia.”56  Originating 
in this location along the Oxus River, the Aryans expanded outward, populating Central Asia.  
Racial theorists rapidly followed in supporting this theory.  The Oxus River was subsequently 
positioned as the “one locality on the earth’s surface to which . . . the Mosaic narrative points, in 
unison with the traditions of Aryan nations, as the cradle of our common race.”57  
 
Visual Representations of the Oxus River:  Photography and Cartography 
 Backed by the premise of preventing Russian expansion and rightfully restoring an Aryan 
homeland, Britain sought to secure the Oxus River.  Due to perennial conflicts and disputes, 
Britain and Russia agreed to name the Oxus River Afghanistan’s northern border in 1873.  
However, this process was never formalized, thereby contributing to future disputes.  Given the 
colonial epistemology of competing powers, the Oxus River became highly politicized, not for 
commercial purposes, as in the Indus River, but for matters of territorial dominance.  British 
cartography shifted towards emphasizing the Oxus River in the sheer abundance of maps 
 
55 Kate Teltscher, “The Rubicon between the Empires”:  The River Oxus in the Nineteenth-Century British 
Geographical Imaginary.”  In Writing Travel in Central Asian History.  Edited by Nile Green (Indiana University 
Press: 2014), p. 141. 
56 Ibid.  
57 Teltscher, “The Rubicon between the Empires,” p. 142.  
 
 
centered around the Oxus, just as it had done with the Indus River a few decades earlier.  Borders 
were explicitly dictated by the Oxus River, namely due to the Russian ‘threat’ that sparked a 
sense of urgency in British mapping.  Moreover, photography gradually replaced sketching as 
one method of visually portraying these rivers.  The use of photography marked a critical shift 
from hand-crafted visual portrayals to other forms of geographic representation.  Nonetheless, 
photographs of the Oxus River echoed themes akin to sketches of the Indus River.  Additional 
photographs simultaneously portrayed Afghanistan as lacking in technology and demonstrated 
the perceived ‘superiority’ of Britain’s presence along the river. 
 
As with sketches of the Indus River, photographs of the Oxus River portrayed the region as 
barren in efforts to condone British intervention.  The photographs from the Afghan Boundary 
Commission emphasized this position of an ‘uncivilized’ Afghanistan considerably more so than 
earlier sketches of the Indus River had.58  As Britain was facing augmenting Russian expansion 
in northern Afghanistan, its photographs of the Oxus River attempted to undermine Russia’s 
position.  By portraying Russian territories along the Oxus River as immensely lacking in 
technology, the photographs suggested that Russia’s presence along the river was largely 
ineffective, if not ‘detrimental,’ in terms of ‘modernizing’ Afghanistan.  By including these types 
of photographs, the Afghan Boundary Commission emphasized many of the contemporary, 
 
58 Afghan Boundary Commission.  ABC 159, 1886.  Sepia print.  152/203 mm. ABC Photographs 117 to 167, 
https://www.phototheca-afghanica.ch/index.php?id=33&no_cache=1 (accessed 25 May 2020). 
 
 
continual themes, demonizing Russia, while glorifying British technology in hopes of gaining 
control over the Oxus River. 
 
British cartography of Afghanistan, thus, became framed by its rivers, almost always utilizing the 
Oxus and often the Indus, the consequences of which will be discussed in the following 
paragraphs.  While maps of the Indus River often included the river’s name in the title, many 
British maps of the Oxus River did not.  Instead, the Oxus River was not associated with borders 
as the Indus River was but the Oxus River itself was the border, hyper-emphasized, politicized, 
and territorialized in this cartography.  Such representations of the Oxus as a border were 
perpetuated by the colonial epistemology of the fight for Afghanistan between Britain and 
Russia, subsequently engraining these mentalities into geographic representations.  
 
Britain repeatedly outlined its desire to establish a military presence along the Oxus River and 
emphasized Russia’s presence along it as well.  The Oxus River was detailed extensively, but not 
in terms of agriculture and profitability, as the Indus was.  Instead, the Oxus River was detailed 
geographically in relation to territorial occupation.  Valleys were not considered in regard to 
Figure 8: Ziyarat of Khwaja Salar at Karkin, portraying Orientalist narratives of 
Russian occupation along the Oxus River. 
 
 
what fruits they could produce but, rather, in how they divided the Oxus River.  To illustrate, in 
Letters from the Afghan Boundary Commission, Kara Bel was described as the territory “which 
divide[d] the watershed of the Murghab from that of the Oxus.”59  In this collection, very rarely, 
if ever, were themes such as fruit production mentioned.  There was some mention of the Oxus 
River’s “slow-running” nature and the presence of sheep and cattle along it; nevertheless, the 
Oxus was overwhelmingly emphasized with regards to occupation, specifically the threat of 
Russian encroachment.60  Unlike Indus River cartography, Oxus River cartography became 
highly politicized maps of political borders between colonial powers, as Britain’s competition for 
dominance intensified. 
 
The Letters from the Afghan Boundary Commission included a map of northern Afghanistan at 
the conclusion of the book.  Entitled Map of the North West Frontier of Afghanistan, the map 
was limited exclusively to the Oxus River territory, but the river itself was hardly visible.61  This 
label was hidden under an abundance of boundary lines between competing powers that 
emphasized Britain’s position above all others.  The map referred to the marked British line as 
the “actual” boundary line, while deeming the Afghan and Russian lines as only “perceived” 
boundary lines.  Within this map and others similar to it, the Oxus River became a political, 
territorialized entity, with British colonial sources paying little to no attention to the role of the 
Oxus River for its local inhabitants.  The map isolated this limited portion of Afghanistan, 
 
59 Charles Edward Yate, Northern Afghanistan or Letters from the Afghan Boundary Commission, (Edinburgh and 
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(accessed 25 May 2020).  
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neglecting the country’s remarkable extraterritoriality, plurality, and mobility.  These necessities 
in Afghanistan’s history and culture were similarly absent in the Afghan Boundary 
Commission's texts that accompanied these maps, demonstrating how Britain had very little 
knowledge of the territory it was attempting to occupy.  British colonialists, instead, emphasized 
the Oxus River in the method that was most valuable to its current political situation, predicated 
on defining boundaries between colonial powers in the competition for Central Asia.  Author of 
Letters from the Afghan Boundary Commission, Charles Edward Yate, underlined the border-
driven purpose to Britain’s colonial presence along the Oxus River.  Despite passing attempts to 
describe local flora and fauna, the overwhelming majority of this work discussed the boundaries 
and territories in dispute, particularly emphasizing Russia’s faulty claims to certain regions.  The 




Oxus River, hence, became the primary object of discourse, serving as “the end of [the Afghan 
Boundary Commission’s] boundary-line.”62  In examining Britain’s military campaign along the 
Oxus River, he acknowledged the Russian threat that inspired such British intervention.  Again, 
he projected a sense of inferiority and decay onto the Russian-occupied territories in 
Afghanistan.  Bokhara, a city at risk of being “permanently annexed by Russia,” “did not look so 
flourishing,” as “the canals were slovenly, walls tumbled down, and houses poor-looking.”63  
 
Conclusion 
 As demonstrated by nineteenth-century colonial sketches, photography, and cartography, 
the contemporary British political and economic climate was extended into its visual 
representations of Afghanistan.  In other words, dominant epistemologies of economic profit and 
colonial competition became absorbed and engrained into maps of the region.  To varying 
degrees, these colonial dilemmas were broadened into the politicization of the Indus and Oxus 
Rivers as definitions of Afghanistan’s borders.  No matter how much detail British colonial 
agents included about the Indus River’s agricultural profitability or the Oxus River’s strategic 
location, they failed to account for Afghanistan’s extensive migratory history and culture in the 
territories they strove to occupy.  These reports focused too exclusively on these rivers as tools 
of colonial manipulation while homogenizing and disregarding the native populations that 
surrounded them.  Colonial mapping of Afghanistan was reduced to British perceptions of 
modernity, profitability, and global conceptions of power.  Throughout the 1830s, Britain’s 
motive to control the Indus River was fruit and nut production and profitability.  Consequently, 
mapping came to reflect the cities that fostered this trade, as well as the fertile valleys that 
 
62 Yate, Letters from the Afghan Boundary Commission, p. 226. 
63 Yate, Letters from the Afghan Boundary Commission, p. 242. 
 
 
encompassed the Indus branches.  The Oxus River had a different experience, becoming so 
politicized that the river itself was hardly distinguishable underneath the plethora of mapped 
political borders.  However, like the Indus River, Oxus River cartography reflected the British 
colonial climate, objectifying Afghanistan and the Oxus River as tools for global dominance.  
Within these processes, there was little attention to Afghanistan’s peoples and how they 
perceived their own identities and positions within their own country.  Reductionist narratives 
offered a simplicity that eased British control of South Asia.  By situating these rivers in terms of 
exploitability, Britain could support a linear narrative of history that suited its dominance of 
Afghanistan.  Nineteenth-century British colonial mapping was overwhelmingly dependent on 
self-interest, choosing to view Afghanistan in whatever light would suit its political agenda.  
However, these are not phenomena limited to nineteenth-century Britain.  With the emergence of 
ethnic mapping, narratives of a Pashtun-dominated state, and an overall post-9/11 Orientalist 
climate, it is crucial to question how the current political atmosphere impacts visual 
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